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Coming off drugs: A critical history of the withdrawing body 
 
Abstract 
Heroin withdrawal is perhaps one of the most taken-for-granted components of the addiction 
framework. Heroin users as well as researchers, policy makers and practitioners have become 
dependent on it for thinking about and acting upon the process of heroin leaving the body. It is 
thought to be among the most challenging aspects of the recovery journey and has been linked to a 
range of public health, legal and social problems. The taken-for-granted nature of heroin withdrawal 
has arguably limited its scrutiny in sociological and historical analyses. This article offers an 
alternative and critical perspective that draws attention to the heterogeneity of historical events and 
strategies that have left their mark on the withdrawing body of the heroin user. It maps changes in the 
discourse from the 18
th
 century to the present, and closes with developments in the neuroscience of 
addiction, which have relocated withdrawal from the body to the neurocircuitry of the brain and 
reframed it as a negative emotional state. This new language suggests the future of the discourse of 
withdrawal might be relatively short. The analysis moves beyond existing understandings of 
withdrawal as the simple absence of drugs from the body. 
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Introduction 
Heroin withdrawal is perhaps one of the most taken-for-granted components of the addiction 
framework. Heroin users as well as researchers, policy makers and practitioners have become 
dependent on it for thinking about and acting upon the process of heroin leaving the body. This 
process is thought to be among the most challenging aspects of the recovery journey and, moreover, 
the occurrence of withdrawal symptoms has been linked to legal, social and public health harms 
(Mateu-Gelabert, et al, 2010; Phillips, 2016). As a result, it has become the target of broader strategies 
of control, such as methadone maintenance treatment, that aim to remove or limit episodes of 
withdrawal from the daily lives of heroin users. Recently this practice, described by some in Britain as 
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“parking people on methadone”, has been called into question by a recovery-oriented drug treatment 
system that prioritizes the goals of abstinence and recovery (Home Office, 2010). One of the 
consequences of this broader shift in British drug policy, according to Neale et al (2013), has been to 
motivate a desire among heroin users to become heroin-free long before they are ready. This recent 
interest in producing drug-free bodies provides a timely opportunity to subject withdrawal to critical 
analysis. 
The addiction concept has been critically analyzed by historians and sociologists (Berridge, 
1999; Campbell, 2007; Harding, 1988; Seddon 2010). However, with some notable exceptions 
(Connors, 1994; Koutroulis, 1998; Lindesmith, 1938; Walmsley, 2013), withdrawal has been largely 
neglected in historical and sociological analyses. Lindesmith (1938) was the first to draw attention to 
the role of cultural and social meanings in constituting the reality of opiate withdrawal. Opiate 
“addicts”, he argued, did not “know what is wrong with them the first time that the abstinence 
symptoms occur” (1938, p. 603). The meaning of withdrawal, he argued, was not given in the object 
itself but emerged through social interactions within a heroin subculture. For Connors (1994), 
withdrawal belongs to the mythology of the heroin subculture where it provides a culturally 
sanctioned means for expressing an emotional pain masked by the physicality of withdrawal. Drawing 
on Roland Barthes concept of myth, she argued that the mythology of withdrawal transformed the 
meaning of emotional pain into a form that could then be expressed through stories about withdrawal 
pains in the physical body.  
In contrast, Koutroulis (1998) linked the language and subject positions adopted by heroin 
users to talk about and experience their withdrawing bodies to the discourses of chemical slavery and 
cleanliness. She conceptualized withdrawal as a process of becoming clean and linked it to the 
broader body project of becoming a self-regulating and healthy, normal body. For Koutroulis (1998), 
interestingly, the participants in her study voluntarily and occasionally stepped into withdrawal not to 
become clean per se but to experience temporary freedom from the daily use of heroin. This was 
identified as resistance against the slave subject position. These anthropological and sociological 
analyses of withdrawal (Connors, 1994; Koutroulis, 1998; Lindesmith, 1938) offer an alternative 
conceptualization of withdrawal as a culturally and socially situated practice as well as a fragmented 
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and unfinished project of becoming as opposed to a completed project of being clean. However, these 
authors link withdrawal to existing strategies of power designed to prevent HIV (Connor, 1994) and 
facilitate the expert removal of drugs from the body (Koutroulis, 1998). Elsewhere, I have traced the 
emergence of this way of governing the addicted body to a convergence between expert discourses of 
poisoning and addiction in the 19
th
 century in which it was reproduced as a poisoned object 
(Walmsley, 2013). This article builds on this argument and extends the above literature on withdrawal 
by critically analyzing the discursive constitution of the withdrawing body against the backdrop of 
historical events.  
 
Method 
The historical formation of the withdrawing body was traced and mapped out using the tools of the 
genealogical method (Foucault, 1994a). The rationale for using this method was to develop an 
alternative and critical perspective on withdrawal which draws attention to the heterogeneity of 
historical events and strategies that have left their mark on the withdrawing body of the heroin 
user. The practice of working genealogically involves the analysis of lines of descent and 
emergence. In other words, its purpose is not to search for a single origin or unified process or to 
produce a linear and singular narrative of withdrawal. Instead, the task of the genealogist is to map 
the complexity of its development by revealing the multiplicity of events and relations that have 
touched and shaped the discursive construction of the withdrawing body. This approach is 
underpinned by a conception of the body as a malleable and plastic object or, as Foucault put it, a 
“body totally imprinted by history” (1994a, p. 376).  
Importantly, the genealogical method situates the body within a history of struggle and 
domination by changing forms of expert power and knowledge. Power relations in society were 
traditionally arranged through a juridical model that took the form of hierarchy and deduction, and 
operated on the conduct of subjects through law and rights. In contrast, later in the 18
th
 century, 
power relations became linked to expert knowledge and entangled with the lives of individuals and 
population. Modern power relations work to adjust and correct the lives of individuals and 
populations through domains of expertise (Rose, 2007). The transformation of withdrawal through 
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these new forms of expertise is the main focus of this article. The analysis below draws on a range 
of primary and secondary sources from the 18
th
 century to the present. The primary sources were 
identified in existing books and articles on the history of addiction (Berridge, 1999; Walmsley, 
2013) and then sourced, along with further citations from these primary sources, through the 
British Library.  
The primary aim of this article is to identify the influence of contingencies, discontinuities 
and power-knowledge relations on how we think about and govern withdrawing bodies. The story 
begins in the 18
th
 century with an analysis of the emergence of a traditional construct of the act of 
coming off opiates and an associated practice of self-care. After describing the subjugation of this 
practice and its reconfiguration by toxicological discourse, it moves on to explore problematisations 
of withdrawal through key psychiatric styles of thought. From here, it examines the mobilization of 
the withdrawing subject by risk management strategies designed to manage threats to the health of the 
population. The story concludes by drawing attention to the impact of a unifying trend in the drugs 
field on the discourse of withdrawal and the production of new subjects of withdrawal. Cannabis 
withdrawal is used to illustrate this claim. The article is primarily concerned with the formation of 
withdrawal in the British context, but it draws attention to the influence of psychiatric understandings 
of withdrawal that developed in the United States and found their way to the UK in the 1970s. 
 
Leaving off opium: From side effect of an incorrect dose to the poisoned body 
Opiate withdrawal is a modern creation. It was not until the end of the 19
th
 century that the non-
medical use of opiates was considered a problem that required medical intervention (Berridge, 1999; 
Seddon, 2010). Up until this point, the medical profession was primarily concerned with exploring the 
merits and correct use of opiates in medical practice, rather than treating their non-medical use or the 
difficulties experienced at the end of treatment. However, this does not mean that the medical 
profession was unaware of the challenges associated with ending treatment.    
On this point, in the 18
th
 century, when an opiate left the body after a long episode of medical 
use, experts referred to it as leaving off (Jones, 1700; Thickness, 1749; Lewis, 1778). Leaving off 
cannot be traced back to a single cause or person but emerged within the context of the formation of 
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modern medicine and the market in medicines and an associated problem of iatrogenic poisoning. 
Traditional medicine was practiced by a wide range of medical practitioners who drew on competing 
ideas and medical theories to form their judgements of illness (Jewson, 1976). However, the arrival of 
the market in medicines encouraged a shift from “good advice” and “little medicine”, which 
characterized the traditional medical encounter, to the more profitable “little advice” and “much 
medicine” (Cook, 1994). In practice, fee-paying patients began to expect greater quantities of “heroic 
and extensive remedies” from medical practitioners (Jewson, 1976, p. 624). At this time, it was 
argued that this model of medical practice and, in particular, the greed of apothecaries, resulted in an 
increase in iatrogenic poisoning (Anon, 1701). On the other hand, this accusation can be interpreted as 
a display of wider tensions and conflict between physicians and apothecaries (Walmsley, 2013). 
Returning to the matter at hand, the problem of iatrogenic poisonings triggered wider 
considerations among medical practitioners about the proper use of potentially poisonous substances 
in medical practice (Banyer, 1721; James, 1747; Jones, 1700; Mead, 1747). For example, in 
responding to this problem, Jones (1700) recommended the rule of moderation as a solution and 
juxtaposed it with the excessive and long and lavish use of opium. Leaving off was linked to long and 
lavish use and was reported by patients following an extended period of medical treatment (Jones, 
1700). It was described by them as a “deep and insupportable sadness, with anxiety, languidness” 
(Thicknesse, 1749, p. 378) and “great lowness, languor, and anxiety” (Lewis, 1778, p. 189). 
Thicknesse (1749), who was concerned with prevention rather than treatment, claimed that these 
symptoms continued until the patient returned to opium.  
This historically specific way of thinking about leaving off can be understood through the 
explanatory framework of bedside medicine (Jewson, 1976). In his influential paper on the history of 
medical knowledge, Jewson (1976) conceptualized key transformations in the practice and production 
of medical knowledge through what he referred to as medical cosmologies. Medical cosmologies “set 
out the first principles of problem orientation, explanatory strategy, methodology and acceptable 
results … [they] enable their adherents to make sense of and to act within the world” (Jewson, 1976, 
p. 622). The cosmologies he identified included bedside medicine, hospital medicine and laboratory 
medicine, with each successive cosmology restructuring the relationship between the patient and 
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medical power and knowledge. From the perspective of bedside medicine, the medical knowledge 
produced was closely aligned with the self-report of patients and, in turn, this knowledge informed 
how the practitioner responded to their illness. The amount of medicine prescribed was guided by a 
commitment to removing illness from the life of the fee-paying customer. This explanatory 
framework structured the way in which leaving off was thought about and responded to by the 
medical profession. Its cause was linked to the conduct of the medical practitioner, as opposed to the 
behaviour of the patient. Furthermore, leaving off was not linked to an underlying lesion, but existed 
in the symptoms reported by the patient. This can be contrasted with modern withdrawal which has 
specific locations in the body of the drug user as well as a linear and self-limiting duration determined 
by the natural rhythms of the human body (Green & Gossop, 1988; Himmelsbach, 1941). 
Hospital medicine gradually replaced bedside medicine and subsequently reconfigured the 
relation between medical power and knowledge and the body (Jewson, 1976). The hospital was part 
of a new strategy of power directed at improving the health of individuals and populations 
(Armstrong, 1995; Foucault, 1994b). In particular, it was associated with the new medical cosmology 
through which experts began to see and know illness by physically examining the body before and 
after death. In contrast to bedside medicine, the symptoms of illness became a sign of an internal 
abnormality and the sick person became reduced to a group of organs, each synchronized and 
allocated a specific function (Jewson, 1976). Importantly, this new configuration brought about a new 
discursive relation between the body and opium which was separate from the existing set of power-
relations that governed the use of medicines by medical practitioners. Initially the dominant power 
relation was concerned with the actions of legal subjects in mixing and preparing medicines for their 
use in practice. These rules were enforced by physicians who had the legal right to make certain that 
correct mixing procedures were followed by all medical practitioners (Banyer, 1721). In contrast, in 
the space of the hospital, the relation between opium and the body was subjected to a new set of rules 
and objectified by medical knowledge. This took the form of “Rules to be observ’d in taking opium” 
(James, 1747, p. 386-387) such as ensuring that opium “does not make the pulse quicker or harder” 
and “ought never to be taken on a full stomach” (1747, p. 388). Unlike the previous rules, which were 
arguably structured by the juridical model of power (which involved hierarchy, deduction, and a set of 
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laws and rights governing conduct), these new rules were informed by a new way of seeing, knowing 
and acting upon, as well as experiencing, the medicine-body relation. Nevertheless, the guidance 
regarding leaving off was still directed at preventing its occurrence (Lewis, 1778; Thicknesse 1749). 
Although medical practitioners were not primarily concerned with treating leaving off, there 
is evidence that some opium users employed techniques to act on their bodies in order to cope with 
coming off opiates. The practice of substituting opium with alcohol was common among the lower 
ranks of society (de Quincey, 1971; Lewis, 1778; Pereira, 1854; Thicknesse, 1749). Pereira, in the 
Medica Materia, made reference to “those who do make the attempt to discontinue the use of opium, 
usually mix it with wax, and daily diminishing the quantity of the opium, the pill at last contains 
nothing but wax” (1854, p. 1038). On this point, it is worth drawing attention to a similar practice 
found by Stimson and Oppenheimer (1982) in their ethnography of addiction treatment in psychiatric 
clinics during the 1970s. Psychiatrists mixed methadone and water into a single solution and then 
every dose of the solution that was given to the patient was replaced with an equal amount of water 
until s/he was drinking green water. In this example, heroin “addicts” were positioned as irrational 
subjects who were incapable of safely managing the drug-body relation. Pereira’s (1854) statement, in 
contrast, suggests that this technique was, at this point in history, autonomous from expert control and 
therefore supported the agency of the opium user to act upon his/her own body. In a contemporary 
context, however, this self-care practice would be limited by the legal and expert control of heroin and 
its substitutes and by the dominant risk management strategies that produce individuals not as 
irrational, but as at risk and/or risk producing subjects (Harris & Rhodes, 2013). These self-care 
practices were gradually subjugated by broader events that linked leaving off to the danger of 
poisoning (Christison, 1850) and the formation of legislative control. 
The framing of leaving off as a problem of poisoning can be traced back to a debate between 
a physician (Little, 1850) and a toxicologist (Christison, 1850) on the most appropriate treatment for 
habitual opiate use. This disagreement can be explained by drawing attention to the different 
rationalities that underpinned each of their positions. On one side of the debate, Little (1850), a 
medical doctor working in China, and drawing on a medical rationality, recommended the gradual 
reduction of opium with the help of various medical remedies. On the other, Christison (1850), an 
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eminent toxicologist who viewed opium as a poison, argued for its immediate removal from the 
poisoned body. This new framing of the opium-body relation was informed by Christison’s work as 
an expert witness in criminal poisoning trials and the specific requirements involved in investigating 
and establishing the truth of criminal poisoning (Christison, 1829). In this respect, the problem of 
proving the charge of criminal poisoning introduced the theme of temporality in to the discourse of 
the poisoned body. As Christison explained, in England, the law stated that any death that resulted 
from the administration of a poison “must take place within a year” for it to be a defined as a crime 
(1829, p. 34). This anatomical atlas (Foucault, 1975) of the poisoned body described the process of 
poisoning in terms of a journey which had a biological and temporal reality. Shortly after the poison 
was ingested it travelled from the mouth to the stomach and then through the internal space of the 
body, which was marked by the poison, until it found its way to the nervous system. In contrast to the 
previous explanation of leaving off, this three-dimensional model reconstructed the symptoms of 
leaving off as a sign of a nervous system disordered by the continued action of poisons. 
This framing of the poisoned body had a significant impact on the medical treatment of 
addiction at the end of the 19
th
 century (Walmsley, 2013). Experts involved in the treatment of 
habitual opium use came to see and know leaving off not simply as a side effect of an immoderate 
dose (Lewis, 1778; Thicknesse, 1749) but as an objective sign of a nervous system disordered by the 
repetitive action of poison (Christison, 1829). Furthermore, it could no longer be managed by the 
creative techniques of the autonomous subject (Pereira, 1854), but had to be abruptly withdrawn by an 
expert (Fleming, 1868). The rationale for the abrupt removal of poison was that its continued action 
on the nervous system of the habitual opium user must be prevented.  
However, this approach was later problematised by wider concerns regarding the influence of 
neurasthenia on modern civilization (Courtwright, 2005). The problem of neurasthenia, which was 
referred to as the cry of the biological system struggling with its environment, was articulated at the 
level of population and influenced the explanatory frameworks that guided the treatment of addiction 
(Berridge, 1999; Walmsley, 2012). In this respect, medical experts began to claim that the fragile 
neurasthenic body of the middle class opium addict might not survive the grueling demands of abrupt 
poison removal (Mattison, 1892). Abrupt withdrawal became viewed as far too dangerous for the 
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neurasthenic body and therefore medical experts began to recommend maintaining the poisoned, 
albeit fragile nervous system on a daily amount of an opiate (Mattison, 1892:12). This principle of 
regularity that manifested itself in maintenance prescribing and in the conduct of middle class life was 
important in preserving the life of neurasthenic bodies. 
Maintenance prescribing was incorporated into British drug treatment policy and practice at 
the beginning of the 20
th
 century (Ministry of Health, 1926). Nevertheless, this imagination of the 
neurasthenic body embedded within maintenance prescribing also helped separate “drug addicts” of 
the middle class from “drug addicts” belonging to the dangerous classes. The abrupt removal of 
poison was the preferred method of treatment for “drug addicts” serving prison sentences and was 
underpinned by the view that their bodies differed from those of the middle class (Walmsley, 2013). 
Interestingly, the abrupt method of withdrawing the addicted prisoner continued well into the 20
th
 
century. These localized and contextual meanings that shaped and marked the withdrawing body are 
important in terms of understanding how it is thought about, acted upon and subjectively experienced 
by the individual. 
 
Withdrawal and psychiatric expertise: From denial to abstinence syndrome  
The period between the 1920s and 1960s has been described as the quiet period in British drugs policy 
(Berridge, 1999). After maintenance prescribing became a legitimate medical response, political 
interest in the addiction problem gradually receded into the background. Nonetheless, the discourse of 
withdrawal continued to be developed, and disseminated through scientific journals, by psychiatrists 
working within designated psychiatric hospitals in the United States. These hospitals operated under 
the guidance of the US Public Health Service and specialized in the research and treatment of the 
addiction problem. They were recognized in Britain for producing key insights and progressing 
knowledge on the nature of addiction (Adams, 1939). Unlike in Britain, where the Home Office and 
Ministry of Health reached a consensus on how to tackle the opium problem (Berridge, 1999), in the 
United States psychiatric explanations of addiction were used to “protest punitive criminalization” 
(Campbell, 2007, p. 16). It is not my intention to explore the broader events surrounding the 
development of the addiction framework in Britain and the United States as they have been 
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successfully mapped out elsewhere (Berridge, 1999; Campbell, 2007; Courtwright, 2005; Seddon, 
2010). My interest lies in drawing attention to the overlooked and subtle, but important, changes to 
the discourse of withdrawal in the United States which later informed research and treatment of 
addiction in Britain during the 1970s.  
Within US psychiatric institutions, the perspective through which experts observed and 
explained the addiction problem can be linked to specific thought styles (Chen, 2014) or laboratory 
logics (Campbell, 2007). These are explanatory frameworks that shape and structure particular ways 
of thinking, seeing and practicing. As Rose explains a “style of thought is not just about a certain form 
of explanation, about what it is to explain, it is also about what there is to explain” (2007, p. 12). The 
thought styles that provided coherence and explanation for the study and treatment of addiction during 
this historical period included psychopathology, organic psychiatry and pharmacology. In many ways, 
they resemble medical cosmologies (Jewson, 1976) as they determine how problems are framed, the 
expert-patient relation and the methods for the production of knowledge. Additionally, as cosmologies 
or logics became less person- and more object-oriented, which was evident in the shift from bedside 
to hospital medicine (Jewson, 1976), drug users begin to play a lesser role in the production of 
knowledge (Campbell, 2007). In fact, within certain cosmologies or logics, experts re-inscribe new 
meanings to the words spoken by the subject. In terms of withdrawal, this can be seen in the 
explanatory framework of psychopathology. 
The psychopathological perspective found it difficult to establish the existence of withdrawal 
as a real entity that could be known separately from an inadequate personality (Ausubel, 1948; Kolb, 
1927; Lambert et al, 1930). As Ausubel argued, the symptoms reported by the patient were “very 
dramatic and reminiscent of hysteria…they are undoubtedly influenced by the personality of the 
addict” (1948, p. 226). The inadequate personality was also part of a dividing practice which allowed 
those diagnosed as drug addicts to be divided into psychopathic and non-psychopathic groups (Kolb, 
1927). This form of objectification was made possible by a shift in the ways of producing truth -- 
from observational to interpretative techniques. This practice of reinterpreting the words of the addict 
was significant in terms of problematizing the truth and ontological status of withdrawal. 
Withdrawal was eventually separated from the personality and reproduced as a medical 
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syndrome by Himmelsbach (1941) and a team of researchers at the Addiction Research Centre 
(ARC). The practices used by these researchers derived from the organic tradition of psychiatry 
(Campbell, 2010). The instrument that made it possible to see and know withdrawal as an objective 
reality was the Abstinence Syndrome Intensity (ASI) point scale. The ASI scale produced withdrawal 
in an “objective quantitative manner” and subsequently removed the speaking subject from the 
production of the truth of withdrawal (Andrews & Himmelsbach, 1944, p. 288). The symptoms were 
visualized, differentiated, broken down into temporal units (hours, days), classified and then 
compared to the normal functioning of the body. Abstinence deviations included: respiratory rate; 
systolic blood pressure; temperature; blood sugar; diastolic blood pressure; sleep; caloric intake; and 
basal metabolic rate (Himmelsbach, 1941). The ASI scale opened up new ways for researchers to 
investigate and reflect on the problem of addiction and new ways for addicts to be acquainted with 
their withdrawing bodies from a temporal and molecular perspective. 
The knowledge produced by the ASI scale became instrumental in the diagnosis, 
classification and treatment of drug addiction (Himmelsbach, 1941; Winick, 1957). Andrews and 
Himmelsbach (1944) used this instrument to make truth claims about the length of time it took for a 
person to become addicted to opiates. Using the ASI scale, they were able to observe and measure 
abstinence symptoms in the days after the first dose was consumed. In fact, abstinence symptoms 
were central to the diagnosis of addiction and were used to police the boundaries of the addiction 
discourse. The lack of measureable abstinence symptoms led Winick (1957) to claim that cocaine 
and cannabis did not cause addiction. Additionally, the scores produced by the ASI scale were used 
to assess the severity of the symptoms and to inform an appropriate regimen of detoxification or 
maintenance treatment (Andrews & Himmelsbach, 1944; Himmelsbach, 1941). Interestingly, 
although there was no supporting evidence, experts continued to claim that withdrawal “may become 
so intense as to cause death” and as such advised that detoxification must take place within a hospital 
(Himmelsbach, 1941, p. 829). This statement linking withdrawal with death not only reinforced 
expert responsibility, but it continued the separation of the drug user from his or her withdrawing 
body and the practice of self-care. 
The explanation of withdrawal that emerged within this new configuration was qualitatively 
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distinct from previous ones (Christison, 1828; Mattison, 1892). From the perspective of the organic 
tradition of psychiatry, it was claimed that the “organism…is suffering because of abstinence from 
and not the presence of morphine in the body” (Adams, 1939, p. 21, emphasis original). The body was 
no longer an object that had been poisoned, but it had adjusted its internal physiology to accommodate 
the poison and restore balance to the organism. For Himmelsbach, this process was related to the 
“mechanisms for the maintenance of homeostasis” which were directly affected by the continued 
action of the drug upon the organism (Himmelsbach, 1941, p. 829). He hypothesized that these 
disturbances were possibly located in the hypothalamus, a region of the brain implicated in the 
homoeostatic function. This was not the only theory proposed for opiate withdrawal -- other theories 
included immunity theory, endocrine dysfunction, anaphylactic theory (Ausubel, 1948) and 
hyperthyroidism (Himmelsbach, 1941) -- but Himmelsbach (1941) argued that it was best suited to 
the emerging models of tolerance and habituation. Nonetheless, this new discourse of withdrawal was 
soon employed and further developed by addiction experts in Britain shortly after heroin addiction 
reemerged as a political and social problem in the 1960s and 1970s. 
 
Reconstructing withdrawal through the behaviorist equation 
In Britain, during the 1960s and 1970s, the strategy for treating addiction underwent a significant 
transformation in response to criticisms regarding its negative impact on levels of addiction and on the 
social productivity of those classified as addicts. The first criticism was directed at the perceived 
failure of medically assisted detoxification within a psychiatric institution. This criticism of the “total 
abstinence at all costs” approach typical in psychiatric institutions can also be found in the United 
States (Brill & Jaffe 1967, p. 376; Dole & Nyswander, 1967). The basis of this criticism was the 
observation that drug addicts often relapsed shortly after leaving institutions and struggled to take up 
socially productive roles. This struggle was linked to the fact that addicts oscillated between the 
euphoric effects of the drug and the withdrawal symptoms caused by their dwindling presence 
(Connell, 1969, cited in Connell & Strand, 1994).  
Methadone maintenance, which originated within the pharmacological thought style, was put 
forward as the solution to this problem, first in the United States (Dole et al., 1966; Dole & 
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Nyswander, 1967) and then later in Britain (Brill & Jaffe, 1967; Connell & Strand, 1994). Dole and 
Nyswander (1967) recommended maintenance on methadone, accompanied by an aftercare package 
that included psychological and social support to help cultivate socially productive lives. 
Interestingly, Dole et al (1966) refer to an experiment in which methadone was withheld from some 
patients without any reported withdrawal symptoms. Not only did these patients not recognize this 
fact, they “failed to identify the symptoms with abstinence … the patients believed that they had 
caught cold” (Dole et al, 1966, p. 125). Although they did not comment on this observation, this 
account of withdrawal outside of its familiar interpretive framework shares similarities with the 
claims of Lindesmith (1938) and Koutroulis (1998). 
The second criticism was directed at the overly generous prescribing practices of general 
practitioners who were blamed for contributing to the rising levels of addiction in the social body 
(Lart, 1998; Stimson & Oppenheimer, 1982). The new addicts, who caused much alarm, were 
noticeably younger than the previous ones and purchased their heroin outside of the existing doctor-
patient relation, which characterized the British System. In response, a new clinic model of treatment 
was established in out-patient facilities of psychiatric hospitals. The clinics encouraged greater 
collaboration between psychiatry, probation and social work. Initially, the clinics centralized the 
dispensing of maintenance doses of heroin but eventually made the transition to methadone 
maintenance treatment. The arrival of the clinics was accompanied by a new “diagram of power” that 
incorporated notification procedures, case-finding and the survey (Lart, 1998). This produced new 
ways of seeing and knowing addiction as a social contagion and serious threat to the moral health of 
society (Lart, 1998; Mold, 2006). In practical terms, the clinics were faced with the problem of, on the 
one hand, finding a balance between under-prescribing and the risk of losing patients to illicit supplies 
of heroin and, on the other, overprescribing and furthering the spread of addiction. This issue was 
further compounded by the heavy reliance on the self-report of addicts. Connell and Strang (1994) 
referred to these problems as the prescribing tightrope. The rules of prescribing, in this context, were 
informed not by pharmacological logics, but by wider concerns with controlling the spread of 
addiction in society.  
The clinic system can also be understood as part of a new social arrangement of biological 
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psychiatry in which greater use was made of pharmaceutical drugs to produce “subjects who can cope 
with their social roles” (Rose, 1989, p. 69). The social productivity of the drug addict was part of the 
motivation behind the introduction of methadone (Brill & Jaffe, 1967). The objective of the clinics 
was to maintain “drug addicts” on methadone until they could be motivated to enter detoxification. 
The therapeutic work of the clinic involved greater collaboration between behaviorist psychologists 
and psychiatrists. Behaviorist psychologists, according to Rose (1999), were motivated to establish 
this type of collaboration by a need to establish legitimacy in relation to psychoanalysis. The strategic 
collaboration between psychiatrists and behaviorist psychologists was significant because it enabled 
withdrawal to be seen and known through the language of behaviorism. This type of withdrawal was 
referred to as “chronic covert abstinence syndrome” (Cohen et al, 1983, p. 174) and was found in 
patients on maintenance doses of methadone (Cohen et al, 1983; Meyer, 1995) and in those who had 
been successfully detoxed (Gossop & Green, 1988). Furthermore, psychological withdrawal was also 
found in non-physically dependent heroin users who simply had a “psychological interest in the 
junkie identity” (Gay et al, 1973, p. 287). These subjects were known as “chippers” (Marks et al, 
1969) or “pseudo-junkies” (Gay et al, 1973), and their practices gave rise to the concept of “pseudo-
heroinism” (Primm & Bath, 1973). 
The reality of psychological withdrawal was arguably produced through two truth-producing 
practices: urine testing and a new instrument for measuring the abstinence syndrome. Urine testing 
was introduced to the practices of the clinic as a more objective measure of truth (Brill & Jaffe, 1967; 
Lart, 1998) than those previously used to diagnose an addiction (Himmelsbach, 1941). In part, the 
advantage of including urinalysis in the assessment process was that it reduced the time spent on 
completing assessment forms as well as overcoming the concerns experts held about the self-reports of 
those diagnosed as drug addicts (Marks et al 1969). In diagnosing physical dependency, urine tests 
also provided the truth of psychological withdrawal and, in turn, excluded “pseudo-junkies” from 
receiving unnecessary prescriptions of methadone from clinics. Alternatively, urine tests have been 
conceptualized as suspect technologies as they reproduce those defined as drug addicts as untruthful 
citizens (Campbell, 2005). Nevertheless, urine testing has since become firmly established in the 
assessment and monitoring procedures of local drug treatment services in the UK (Department of 
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Health, 2007) to the point where test results determine life-changing decisions about individual liberty 
and parental responsibility.  
The second truth-producing practice was the Opiate Withdrawal Scale, which was an 
instrument designed to measure subjective states (Gossop et al, 1987; Green & Gossop, 1988). The 
failure to recognize psychological withdrawal was blamed on Himmelsbach’s (1941) preoccupation 
with the “more objective, easily measurable signs of opiate withdrawal” (Cohen et al, 1983, p. 167; 
Gossop et al, 1987). The wider interest in measuring subjective states was characteristic of the clinic 
period (McGregor, 1989) and behavioral approaches (Rose, 1999; 2007). In explaining psychological 
problems, behaviorism did not need to dig deep into the psyche. It could remain at the level of the 
problem itself; “the discrepancy between behaviour produced and behaviour desired” (1999, p. 79). 
Unlike biological psychiatry, it did not need to make reference to an organic malfunction, as 
psychological withdrawal is not an illness, but a “misshaping of a psychology” (1999, p. 79). In other 
words, this tool represented, and in turn produced, withdrawal as a psychological object. 
Withdrawal previously existed as a biological process with a measurable time frame; it had a 
beginning, middle and end. Its temporality was mapped onto the biological processes through which 
homeostasis returned to the body following the departure of drugs. In contrast, writing in the British 
Medical Journal, Meyer broke with this temporal frame by arguing that psychological withdrawal 
could be “unending” (1995, p. 310). The truth of withdrawal as a temporally bounded biological 
process collapsed within this behaviorist rationality. 
 
Heroin withdrawal, risk and indigenous self-care techniques 
The enclosed multidisciplinary spaces and practices of the clinics became difficult to sustain against 
the backdrop of widespread anxiety fueled by the arrival of HIV and evidence of a heroin epidemic 
during the 1980s. This anxiety related to a concern that the growing drug-addicted population might 
contaminate the non-addicted population through sexual activity. This event has been described as a 
“catalytic moment for drugs policy” (Seddon, 2010, p. 86) in that it encouraged a transformation 
from a system emphasizing expert responsibility over irrational individuals to a more pragmatic 
public health approach concerned with promoting self-regulation and the reduction of harm 
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(Stimson, 1995; Strang, 1988). This new approach was underpinned by the view that drug-related 
harms posed a greater threat to the health of the population than the drugs themselves (Stimson, 
1995). This required a reconceptualization of the narrowly defined psychological and physical 
harms of the clinic system to public health, social and legal harms (Lart, 1998). In practice, a new 
institutional and multi-disciplinary structure emerged around the idea of harm reduction in which a 
new type of practitioner undertook the task of responsibilising those defined as drug addicts by 
providing them with access to up-to-date information about the transmission of blood borne viruses 
and clean injecting equipment. 
In practice, harm reduction views those defined as drug addicts as health-conscious citizens 
with the capacity for rational decision-making. This was in direct contrast to the previous view of 
them as psychologically and pharmacologically enslaved by the drug and cognitively incapable of 
making rational decisions (Moore & Fraser, 2006). Extending these human qualities to drug addicts, 
who were, up until this point, viewed as irrational and out of control, aligned the policies and 
practices of state-funded drug treatment with the wider objectives of neo-liberal governance (Dean, 
1999). These changes also encouraged a move away from psychiatric and psychological ways of 
thinking about the objectives of treatment to the logic of risk. For example, instead of 
pharmacological or social logics determining an effective dose of methadone, it became determined 
by the necessity of risk reduction. Methadone maintenance supported the conditions required for drug 
addicts to make less risky decisions. Concerns with the improper use of methadone became the battle 
ground for the parking people on methadone debate. 
Risk thinking requires a continuous evaluation and search for factors that are liable to 
produce harms. This motivation has resulted in the analysis of the decision making and everyday 
activities of heroin users in much greater detail (Mateu-Gelabert et al, 2014). For example, the search 
for risk has led to the displacement of psychological and pharmacological dimensions of heroin 
withdrawal by its constitution as a risk factor for the transmission of hepatitis C and the occurrence 
of overdose (Michel et al, 2009; Phillips, 2016). Philips (2016), in this respect, linked hepatitis C 
transmission to withdrawing subjects by arguing that when in withdrawal heroin users are prone to 
making risky decisions such as not cleaning the skin before injecting. Michel et al (2009), 
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furthermore, reproduced this subject when they divided those in heroin withdrawal from those not in 
withdrawal and argued that withdrawing subjects were at greater risk of overdose (Michel et al, 
2009). The risky and irrational decisions made by withdrawing heroin subjects not only threatened 
their own health and others in the heroin subculture (Connors, 1994), but also the health of the 
population. Not all withdrawing heroin subjects, it is important to point out, are positioned as risky 
and constructed as irrational decision makers. Other research argued that some withdrawing heroin 
subjects are able to exercise resilience for short periods of time and, in doing so, avoid placing 
themselves in risky situations (Harris et al, 2012). 
In responding to the need to manage risk, some heroin users deploy withdrawal avoidance 
strategies such as planning ahead and using illicit supplies of methadone (Harris & Rhodes, 2013; 
Sirikantraporn et al, 2012). The diversion of methadone into illicit markets has been framed as 
producing harm (National Treatment Agency, 2005). In this context, the purchase of illicit methadone 
is linked to problems such as increased risk of overdose, future sale on the black market and 
instability of the methadone client. In contrast, Harris and Rhodes (2013) found that illicit supplies of 
methadone were often used by dependent heroin users to protect against withdrawal and, as a result, 
argued for greater recognition of the harm reduction potential of illicit supplies of methadone. 
The indigenous harm reduction strategies reported in the literature can also be understood as 
promoting and expressing agency (Harris & Rhodes, 2013) and, in this sense, as forms of resistance 
to the power exercised over withdrawing bodies. Among the examples provided by Harris and 
Rhodes is Kyle, a heroin user, who articulates a sense of greater autonomy over his body by drawing 
on such indigenous techniques: “I can cut down a lot easier, I can like do 30[mg] in the morning, cut 
down to 20 in the afternoon and then 20 at night” (Harris & Rhodes, 2013, p. 46). In another example 
cited by Harris and Rhodes, the participant explained that if “I don’t feel that it’s needed, I won’t take 
it … that’s my main focus now, is to get off my script, I’ve had enough. I’ll do it my own way” 
(2013, p. 46). Similarly, Neale et al (2013) called for greater acknowledgement of experiential 
knowledge by recovery services. Arguably, these self-care techniques utilized a particular way of 
thinking about the drug-body relation in terms of a temporally bounded, biological journey of drugs 
(or poisons) in the body. This imagination represents the flow of drugs around the body and provides 
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the means through which this drug-body relation can be manipulated, adjusted and acted upon at a 
pace suitable to the consumer’s current situation and directed towards certain ends. In the 
contemporary context, this form of self-care can be facilitated (or restricted) by greater autonomy 
over take-home doses of methadone or access to illicit supplies. The existence of these practices 
highlights the creativity and resourcefulness of drug users in the use of localized techniques for 
coping with coming off heroin (Harris & Rhodes, 2013; Koutroulis, 1998; Pereira, 1854). 
 
Reunifying the field: From withdrawing body to emotional brain 
In this final section, I draw attention to the impact of a reunifying trend on the drugs field in general 
and on the discourse of withdrawal in particular. The first attempt at unifying the drugs field occurred 
around the end of the 19
th
 century when experts, through the concept of “inebriety”, attempted to bring 
together alcohol, cannabis, cocaine and opiates under a single framework. This attempt failed because 
they were unable to find a common denominator for inebriety (Courtwright, 2005). From the 1960s 
onwards, however, risk thinking, together with the extension of neo-liberal rationalities into various 
areas of drugs policy and developments in neuroscientific research on addiction, encouraged greater 
crossover in thinking and working with users of substances such as alcohol, cannabis, heroin and 
tobacco (Courtwright, 2005; Seddon, 2010). This reunifying trend has not only reconstituted the 
discourse of withdrawal but has created new subjects of withdrawal. 
One important element in the reunification of approaches to drugs has been the strategic 
coherence of neo-liberal governance, which has encouraged less distinction between drugs and a 
greater emphasis on strategies to reduce drug-related harms (Seddon, 2010). The reunifying trend has 
been further facilitated by developments in the neuroscience of addiction (Courtwright, 2005) or what 
Rose (2007, p. 12) has referred to as a “‘molecular’ style of thought”. This new thought style has 
opened up new problems to be explained, reconstituted existing ones and brought new entities into 
being. From within this new thought style, addiction, and in turn withdrawal, is no longer located in 
the properties of drugs or in the psychological space of the body, but is found in the neurocircuitry 
and systems of the brain. In particular, researchers working within this thought style have identified 
the dopamine neurotransmitter system as the “common denominator of all compulsions” (Keane & 
19 
 
Hamill, 2010; Vrecko, 2010, p. 39). Psychoactive drugs, it is claimed, mimic naturally occurring 
neurotransmitters in order to “hijack” the brain’s mesolimbic dopamine system. As Campbell (2007) 
has argued, this hijacking metaphor has not only reconfigured the social worlds of addiction 
researchers, such as their beliefs, commitments, relations, logics and explanations for addiction, but 
has placed the brain sciences in a powerful position. 
The hijacking model hypothesizes that withdrawal is the result of neuroadaptations within the 
reward and stress systems of the brain (Koob, 2015; Koob & Simon, 2009). The exposure to 
psychoactive drugs causes the neurocircuitry of the brain to adapt and change in order to restore 
normal functioning. Moreover, within this thought style the language of drug withdrawal is gradually 
being replaced by new terms such as “negative emotional state” (Koob, 2015, p. 76). This new 
language shifts the emphasis from the externally visible markers on the withdrawing body to the 
internally visible markers in the neurochemistry and systems of the brain (Koob & Simon, 2009). To 
put this point another way, the problem of, and explanation for, withdrawal are increasingly becoming 
associated with what Rose (2007) has aptly called the “neurochemical self”. This problematisation of 
withdrawal as an adaptation in neurobiological systems is a long way from the notion of opium 
leaving the body on its own accord or it being abruptly withdrawn from the poisoned body. In fact, 
this new description of the process of heroin leaving the body opens up alternative rationalities and 
techniques for acting upon the body of the user as well as marginalizing existing techniques. 
The negative emotional state hypothesized to be linked with the lack of access to drugs has been 
used to explain the act of continued drug taking and the problem of relapse. In this model of 
addiction, the reinforcement of this negative emotional state can take the temporal forms of acute 
and protracted withdrawal. In other words, researchers claim that this negative emotional state can 
be produced in the brain of the dependent drug user when access to a drug is denied and over an 
extended period of time after this event. This temporality of withdrawal resonates with the 
behaviorist model in which withdrawal was claimed to be potentially unending (Cohen et al, 1983; 
Gossop et al, 1987). However, the influence of social factors that triggered this form of 
psychological withdrawal is noticeably absent from the neurobiological discourse of withdrawal as 
a negative emotional state. Furthermore, this emphasis on neurobiological mechanisms fails to 
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recognize the cultural value of withdrawal for heroin users in the expression of emotional pain and 
in the formation of social relations (Connors, 1994) or the role of cultural and social meanings 
(Koutroulis, 1998; Lindesmith, 1938). This neglect of social factors has been identified as a 
characteristic of contemporary neuroscientific explanations of addiction (Campbell, 2010).  
 The definition of withdrawal as a negative emotional state has also had important implications 
for understandings of withdrawal from other drugs such as cannabis. In 1957, Charles Winick had 
argued that cannabis users did not experience withdrawal symptoms because, unlike opiates, cannabis 
did not “produce physical dependence” (1957, p. 11). The failure to establish the truth of cannabis 
withdrawal can be explained by drawing attention not to the properties of the drug but to the dominant 
cosmology or thought style that shaped the social worlds and procedures by which experts produced 
the truth of withdrawal and addiction. The existence of cannabis addiction and withdrawal had 
previously been rejected because they could not be observed and measured using the Abstinence 
Syndrome Intensity scale (Himmelsbach, 1941). Additionally, withdrawal symptoms were reported by 
only a minority of cannabis users (Carroll et al, 1994; Hesse & Thylstrup, 2013). For this reason, 
Carroll et al (1994) argued, withdrawal should not be treated as superior to other criteria when 
diagnosing cannabis dependence. Arguably, this statement was underpinned by the discourse of 
withdrawal that existed at that time. 
Cannabis addiction and withdrawal were recognized in the fourth edition of the Diagnostic 
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (Hesse & Thylstrup, 2013). This has arguably been made 
possible by the reunifying logic found within the neurobiology of addiction (Koob & Simon, 2009). In 
this respect, cannabis researchers have drawn attention to similarities between cannabis and other 
psychoactive drugs in the way they act on the brain. Wickelgren, for example, argued that “the active 
ingredient in marijuana…results in the same key biochemical event that seems to reinforce 
dependence on other drugs, from nicotine to heroin” (1997, p. 1967). Interestingly, the language used 
to discuss cannabis withdrawal continues to draw from the traditional model of drug withdrawal 
(Budney & Hughes, 2006; Hesse & Thylstrup, 2013). However, the emotional states produced by the 
absence of cannabis have further reinforced the perceived commonality between cannabis and heroin 
use. Drugs such as heroin and cannabis produce a measureable level of anxiety that “may be part of a 
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common experience in withdrawal” (Wickelgren, 1997, p. 1968). The role of emotion in the addiction 
process has been reinforced by Koob (2015), who refers to addiction as the “dark side of emotion”. 
Nevertheless, neurobiological explanations of addiction which enact a reunifying mechanism have 
become an important feature of the conditions of possibility for reimagining the act of coming off 
drugs. 
 
Conclusion 
The genealogical analysis offered in this article attempts to move beyond the taken-for-granted view 
of withdrawal as caused by the absence of drugs from the body. Such a view is associated with 
dominant understandings of the power of drugs to produce effects on the individual and society 
(Fraser & Moore, 2011). Although this perspective on withdrawal has been challenged by 
anthropological and sociological studies of addiction and withdrawal (Connors, 1994; Koutroulis, 
1998; Lindesmith, 1938), these critical studies seldom map the construction of withdrawal against the 
backdrop of historical events and changing strategies of power and expertise. This article has argued 
that the way we think about coming off certain drugs varies according to time and place, and that any 
understanding of drug withdrawal should be located within its historical context. It has not been my 
intention to suggest that individuals who consume heroin, or cannabis for that matter, for an unknown 
period of time and then decide to stop are not challenged by a range of difficulties that manifest in 
various ways. Instead, my intention has been to recognize the plasticity and complexity of the 
withdrawing body and the social and historical contexts in which it has emerged and been governed. 
This genealogy has revealed that the way we currently think about and respond to the 
withdrawing body has a relatively short history and, moreover, in light of recent developments in the 
neurobiology of addiction, that it might also have a limited future. The formation of expert knowledge 
on the opium-body relation during the 18
th
 and 19
th
 centuries was identified as significant in terms of 
transforming the event of coming off opiates from an autonomous process to one requiring expert 
intervention. In this respect, attempts to act on the body of certain drug users can also be read as 
historically located practices concerned with the production of poison-free bodies (Walmsley, 2013) 
and, more recently, with the production of the clean (Koutroulis, 1998) or abstinent (Neale et al, 
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2013) bodies inherent within contemporary discourses of detoxification and recovery. An important 
feature of the current conceptualization of drug withdrawal is its reconfiguration by molecular styles 
of thought. Within this explanatory framework, the existing problem orientation, language and 
interventions associated with the withdrawing body are becoming challenged by those linked to the 
neurochemical self. Defining drug withdrawal as a negative emotional state in the systems of the brain 
opens up new ways to problematise a wider group of drug users as well as new interventions that 
target the brain’s neurotransmitter systems. This is evident in the way this recent discourse of 
withdrawal has furthered expert power over some cannabis users. 
Finally, the theme of self-care and experiential knowledge, first identified in the 18
th
 and early 
19
th
 centuries, has thereafter been largely absent from the history of withdrawal until its recent 
reemergence (Harris & Rhodes, 2013; Koutroulis, 1998). Although this knowledge is a valuable 
resource for the recovery agenda (Neale et al, 2013), it is important to be skeptical. This analysis has 
argued that such knowledge of drug-body relations tends to reproduce dominant ways of thinking 
about withdrawal, its duration and its relation to forms of power. Nevertheless, these examples will 
hopefully provoke discussions about the use of indigenous practices and experiential knowledge in 
drugs policy and practice, and the potential for drug users to reclaim their withdrawing bodies and the 
ability to care for them.  
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